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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Network is a network consisting 
of tiny and limited power sensor nodes communicate wirelessly 
and being deployed at any random places. The unique feature 
of Wireless Sensor Networks that enable continuous data 
collection and monitoring has accelerate the development of 
sensor network related applications ranging from non-sensitive 
to highly sensitive data applications such as in e-Health 
application. However, due to its ability to work without human 
intervention, the sensor nodes are susceptible to clone nodes 
types of attacks. These will then lead to worst consequence 
which is a false message. Therefore, secure communication is 
no more enough in e-health environment. This paper presents a 
rigorous research work in the development of a lightweight 
trusted authentication protocol for wireless embedded devices 
in the e-Health environment. The term trust in this research 
work is based on Trusted Computing Group definition and 
therefore the development is started from the sensor node 
itself. Based on that, an IBE_TRUST e-health authentication 
protocol is presented and analyzed. Conceding the energy 
constraint of the e-health environment, analysis on the power 
and energy consumption is conducted to ensure its practicality. 
This proposed authentication protocol will protect the e-health 
communication system from node cloning attack and replay 
attack. By integrating the trusted authentication protocol in 
mobile health monitoring system, it suggests a great assistance 
in patient-doctor interaction and protects the security of the e-
health data network. 
 





E-health communication system is currently being 
developed due to the enhancement of the Internet of Things 
(IOT). Protecting the wireless sensor network of e-health 
system should be taken as a serious issue in handling the e-
health security aspects such as sensor node authenticity and 
data confidentiality. The designing phase for e-health sensor 
network should consider these aspects and a secure 
authentication phase should be implemented since e-health 
system consists of wireless sensor nodes that transmit highly 
sensitive data and thus extremely susceptible to security 
attacks. There are lots of research discussing on the 
importance of sensor network security and focusing on the 
possible vulnerabilities of WSNs [2][3]. However, with the 
implementation of sensor node in a patient body that are 
mostly left unattended by the health personnel, 
authenticating valid sensor nodes or trusted nodes in the 
network system is also an important issue to be considered.  
According to Trusted Computing Group (TCG) [1] 
requirement, attestation is the fundamental phase of trusted 
computing platforms. The user has to authenticate the 
property of a sensor node by providing confirmation of the 
integrity of its hardware or software over the network. There 
are two major components for this attestation which are 
Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) and remote 
attestation protocol. It is to ensure system integrity and to 
check whether the system has been changed since it is last 
been turned off. Then, remote attestation protocol is to 
determine the identity of a sensor node or a program.   
Nevertheless, in order to integrate this attestation into the 
e-health wireless sensor network system, power energy and 
computation capability are the core issues due to energy 
constraint in the e-health sensor node [4]. Therefore, 
IBE_Trust [5] is proposed to this e-health authentication 
protocol and then power analysis and cryptography process 
analysis are being evaluated throughout this paper.  
The idea of identity-based encryption (IBE) [6] was first 
introduced by Shamir because of the security issues in 
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI). IBE eliminates the need for 
a third party certificate by using the identity of the base 
station to generate private key and encrypt the message data 
transmitted [7]. Authorized users can only decrypt the 
message data. On the other hand, the use of elliptic curve 
cryptography (ECC) algorithm in IBE can reduce the 
computational cost since the key size is shorter than RSA 
authentication protocol [8][9][10] and IBE is an efficient 
authentication protocol [11].  
IBE_Trust is an improved version of the existing IBE 
protocol that is reliable to apply in the e-Health 
authentication environment. A trusted sensor node first 
needs to successfully boot-up and authenticate with the 
mobile device during the login process. The meaning of 
trust sensor here has to comply with the TCG specifications 
of the trusted platform. The integrity of the software in the 
sensor node will be measured through a secure boot process 
in a trusted platform and if it passes, a non-regenerated 
unique identity of the sensor node is produced and then will 
be installed in the mobile device. Then, it will go through 
the IBE_Trust e-health authentication protocol that will be 
discussed later throughout this paper. Mobile device and e-
health base station can detect mischievous coding installed 
in the sensor node through this secure boot process. Using a 
formal analysis software, AVISPA [18], IBE_Trust 
authentication protocol is recognized and it is secured from 
security attacks specifically node impersonation and replay 
attack. 
This paper discusses the implementation of IBE_Trust e-
health authentication protocol on mobile health monitoring 
system and evaluates its feasibility in terms of wireless 
sensor network application. The outline of this paper is: 
Section 2 presents the related works for IBE-Trust and 
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existing e-Health authentication protocol, the following 
Section 3 describes the overall experimental test bed for the 
authentication protocol, Section 4 presents the results and 
analysis of the proposed authentication protocol and finally 
in Section 5 clarifies the conclusion and future research that 
can be developed from this research. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
 
There are lots of e-health monitoring applications that 
have been developed using wireless sensor network 
recently. Most authentication schemes in e-health currently 
are using username and password for identity authorization 
which is susceptible to security attacks such as replay attack 
and masquerade attack. In [12,13,14], basic authentication 
scheme were proposed where a user need to successfully 
verify their identity in the system by log in their username 
and password to the mobile e-health network. Then, it will 
automatically direct the user into the e-health system. The 
use of username and password in authentication protocol has 
been exposed to security attacks such as packet sniffing 
where a perpetrator can listen to the network traffic and get 
an illegal authorization to the data access. Even though we 
have built most of cryptographic and security protocols to 
eliminate these attacks, username and passwords still can be 
cracked using debuggers and dissemblers [14]. Therefore, 
additional security mechanism should be implemented in the 
network system besides using only password for 
authentication to enhance the security of e-health system 
[15]. 
  On the other hand, involvement of an e-health service 
provider or a third-party user in mobile e-health current 
architecture will reduce the reliability of the e-health 
authentication system. Privacy and confidentiality are the 
important aspects in e-health systems and in general, people 
should not expose their private data to any third party except 
for trusted authorities [16,24].  For instance, patient mobile 
device will connect first to a third-party database server or 
to the e-health service providers and then connect to the e-
health base station [17]. 
  IBE_Trust e-health authentication protocol is an identity-
based authentication protocol that confirms data 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. This protocol will 
verify that a sender is a trusted sensor node and behave in 
the expected manner in the network. It comprises of two 
compulsory stages which are pre-registration phase and 
registration phase. This proposed authentication protocol 
also suggests seamless authentication with the base station 
without a need for a third-party server. Therefore, it can 




A. Full Hardware Setup 
The whole system is setup by connecting a pulse sensor to 
a mobile device through Bluetooth application. Since the e-
health environment is between body area sensor networks 
with a patient mobile device, it is more secure to use 
Bluetooth for its smaller range area covered in order to 
avoid interference attack. Some programming codes are 
used to transmit and receive message through sensor node, 
mobile device and e-health base station [20]. IBE_Trust e-
health authentication protocol is performed in the e-health 
base station in order to generate common parameters, master 
key and private key. After successful authentication between 
sensor node and mobile device, the mobile device will send 
a login request to the e-health base station. IBE_Trust e-
health authentication protocol will be implemented in the 
system to establish common session key agreement.  
 
B. Proposed Protocol 
The development of IBE_Trust e-health authentication 
protocol comprises of two main stages which are the 
generation of the sensor node identity in a trusted platform 
and the e-health authentication protocol. This trusted 
computing system ensures that it boots and generates only 
authenticated and genuine code for the non-regenerated 
sensor node identity. Therefore, a secure boot process has to 
be done first prior to the deployment of the e-health 
authentication protocol to achieve trusted environment. Each 
component of the hardware and software for the sensor node 
is validated from the lowest layer to the upper layer. Secure 
boot process has been discussed thoroughly in [19].    
Through the secure boot process, a non-regenerated unique 
identity of the sensor node is produced which will be used as 
node’s identity in the e-health authentication protocol. This 
unique identity is almost impossible to be cloned or to be 
regenerated. thus it protects the whole system from 
masquerade node cloning attack. This IBE_Trust protocol 
works as a biometric concept where we use human physical 
features as the unique identity but for a wireless embedded 
hardware system authentication, a unique identity of the 
sensor node is generated. Figure 1 shows the process flow 
for unique sensor identity generated followed by IBE_Trust 




Figure 1: Process flow of IBE_Trust e-health authentication 
 
After installation of the unique sensor identity value in the 
mobile device or base station, the system will go through the 
IBE_Trust e-Health authentication protocol. It has four 
phases which are pre-registration phase, registration phase, 
login phase and authentication phase. List below states the 




⊕= XOR operation 
 SNi = sensor node identity 
IDmobile= mobile device identity 
s = master key  
a, b, M= random nonce 
K= e-health base station public key 
Pk= e-health base station private key 
* = input value   
 
a. Pre-registration phase 
Pre-registration phase is done in offline mode by the 
healthcare personnel in order to generate a sensor node and 
mobile device unique identity upon connection to the e-
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health network system. It mainly consists of a secure boot 
process that generates the unique identity and also generates 
common system parameters and public key. This 
information will be installed in the sensor node and mobile 
device before registration phase. 
 
b. Registration phase 
In the registration phase, the sensor node will reboot to 
generate its unique identity value as well as generating 
nonce. The non-regenerated unique identity value and the 
nonce will be hashed using security algorithm and then the 
sensor will submit the value to the mobile device. Upon 
receiving the message from the sensor node, the mobile 
device will firstly be installed with the sensor node unique 
identity given at the pre-registration phase.  
Sensor node selects random number, a and computes = Ai 
which is a hash value of sensor node identity concatenated 
with a. 
 𝐴𝑖	 = 	𝐻	(𝑆𝑁𝑖|	𝑎) (1) 
 
Mobile device then computes Fi after receiving Ai from 
the sensor node. 
 Fi	=		Ai	⊕	s	 (2) 
 
where s is a master key generated by the e-health base 
station.  
Mobile device will then generate its unique identity 
together with a nonce value, b and compute Bi. Bi is then 
will be stored in the e-health base station. 
 Bi	=		H(b	⊕	IDmobile)	 (3) 
 
The value of IDmobile and Bi will be stored in the base 
station. The e-health base station will then compute security 
parameter Ci. 
 Ci	=		Bi	⊕	H(s)	⊕	s	 (4) 
 
c. Login phase 
The user turns on the sensor node and connects to the 
mobile device. The sensor will submit SNi* to the mobile 
device. The mobile devices computes:  
 Fi*=	Ai*⊕	s	 (5) 
 
and then compare the value Fi* with the value Fi in its 
memory to verify the legitimacy of the sensor node identity. 
After verification, mobile device generates random nonce 
value, M and computes: 
 CIDi=	Bi*⊕	H(x)	⊕	H(s)	⊕	M (6) 
 
where x is a random value chosen by the e-health base 
station. Then, mobile device computes:  
 
 Ri	=	EK	(M|⊕	IDmobile* (7) 
 
The unique identity of mobile device and the nonce are 
encrypted with the base station public key, K which is the 
server ID to prevent the login information from being 
exposed. The mobile device then sends a login request <Ri, 
CIDi> to the e-health base station. 
d. Authentication phase 
After receiving the login request from the mobile device, 
the e-health base station will firstly verify the mobile device 
unique identity given at the pre-registration phase. The e-
health base station then decrypts Ri using the e-health base 
station private key, Pk and verifies the received unique 
identity value with the one existed in the trust list. If the 
identity is not equal, the login request is rejected and the 
session will be terminated. 
 DK	(Ri)=	obtain	IDmobile* (8) 
 
The e-health base station checks IDmobile*= IDmobile, if 
authentic, it computes 
 Ci*=	CIDi⊕	M	⊕	H(s)	⊕	s (9) 
 
Then, the e-health base station checks Ci*= Ci. The 
equivalency authenticates the legitimacy of the sensor node 
and the mobile device. Thus the login request is accepted 
and a secure session key has established. 
 
IV. RESULT ANALYSIS 
 
This section analyzes the performance of IBE_Trust e-
Health protocol. The analysis focuses on the energy and 
power consumption during the sensor node authentication 
process.  
In RSA-1024, a client can transmit 490 bytes of data and 
a server can transmit up to 314 bytes [8]. Following body 
sensor node 802.15.4 specifications [20] which allow 
transmission up to 100 bytes , RSA requires 5 packets data 
from sensor to base station and 4 packets data from base 
station to sensor. Thus, overall number of packet that is 
required for RSA authentication is 9. For ECC 
authentication, sensor node and base station transmit 138 
bytes of data, which add up to 4 packets.  IBE_Trust e-
health authentication protocol on the other hand requires 
only 3 packets data from sensor to base station and 1 packet 
data from base station to sensor.  
For that reason, by analyzing packets data which is then 
converted into energy consumption, we can see that 
IBE_Trust protocol is more efficient and lower energy 
consumption compared to RSA and ECC protocol. It is due 
to the transmission of username and password in their 
authentication scheme which require large key size and high 
energy. Because of the large key size, RSA authentication 
protocol utilizes the highest energy. In contrast, ECC 
consumes the lowest energy during the transmission since 
this protocol does not have pairing algorithm and IBE_Trust 
on the other hand requires pairing algorithm in order to 
successfully authenticate. But IBE_Trust e-health 
authentication protocol uses the lowest power at receiving 
since the sensor node has to receive only 2 bytes of packets 
data from the e-health base station.  
Figure 2 displays the comparison between RSA, ECC and 
IBE_Trust protocol in terms of energy analysis throughout 
the communication system. 
For Bluetooth with 48-bit computing [25], sensor node is 
able to send up to 100 bytes of packets data and 25 bytes 
packets header. Thus, the total size of packets data 
communication from sensor to base station is 355 bytes, and 
27 bytes from base station to sensor node. 
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Figure 2: Energy analysis 
 
In order to transmit the packets data, it only takes about 
0.1985 seconds or 8.072µWs per bit using Bluetooth 
transceiver. Nevertheless, in order to receive the same 
packets data, it takes about 58.616µWs which is 6.5 times 
longer. We can conclude that, sensor node uses a low 
amount of energy to transmit the packets data compared to 
the energy used in the e-health base station. This explains 
that IBE_Trust protocol is efficient and applicable to use in 
the e-health sensor network authentication. 
Figure 3 shows the analysis on the encryption and 
decryption process. The decryption process uses 17.412W of 
energy utilization which is 68 percent higher compared to 
the encryption process that uses only 5.472W. Since the 
decryption process will be done by the e-health base station, 
the IBE_Trust decryption process does not depend on the 
sensor node requirement as the e-health base station has 




Figure 3: Performance analysis during encryption and decryption process in 
IBE_Trust 
 
Additionally, Figure 4 shows the energy decomposition 
for IBE_Trust e-health authentication protocol. 
Cryptography process which consists of encryption and 
decryption use the most energy consumption.  Lots of 
researches [8][21][22] show that public key cryptography 
process dominates the energy consumption in the network 
system. For that reason, IBE_Trust e-health authentication 
protocol has minimized the cryptography algorithm 








In summary, the proposed authentication technique is 
reliable and secure to be implemented in the e-health 
communication environment. It focuses on a trusted and 
secure communication in the e-health network system which 
consists of sensor node, mobile device and e-health base 
station.  A prototype has been set up in the laboratory using 
a pulse sensor node, developing an e-health application in a 
smartphone, and setting up a database server. The critical 
issue concerning the e-health data security is basically the 
authentication of a sensor node with the mobile device and 
e-health base station. This proposed IBE_Trust e-health 
authentication protocol has ensured that the data received to 
the owner of the mobile device are their own sensor data and 
the e-health base station can only get connected with the 
registered mobile device since the non-regenerated unique 
identity has been installed in the system. There are lots of 
mobile health research has been initiated throughout the 
developing countries and these works have demonstrated 
many researches on the e-health authentication issues.  
We believe that this issue should be handled by a proper 
and secured authentication of the sensor nodes. Basically 
there are several ways to authenticate the body sensor node 
to the mobile device and base station such as password, 
biometrical method and MAC address. However, works on 
trust establishment between sensor and mobile device are 
more reliable and secure.  This work aims at enabling 
password-less authentication between sensor nodes and 
mobile device for seamless operation. With this connection, 
it is now becoming more feasible than before to use mobile 
technology for medical applications. A user can simply 
connect a wireless sensor on their body to a mobile device in 
order to monitor their health data. Thus it will provide a 
better personal health management together with a trusted 
monitoring health system.  
This proposed IBE_Trust e-health authentication protocol 
has contributed to a new method in authenticating a sensor 
node in e-health where a unique and non-regenerated value 
from the sensor trusted platform is used to authenticate the 
sensor node [23]. With this non-regenerated unique identity, 
it is almost impossible to clone the sensor node and 
therefore it can avoid masquerade attack in the e-health 
system. Moreover, secure key distribution mechanism is no 
longer needed since the pre-distribution keys has already be 
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